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Many people now fear crime in Japan, which has had the image of being a safe country, because the crime rate has increased 
dramatically and the rate of crime detection has decreased at the same time. As demand for low-crime residential areas becomes 
stronger, low-crime rates may affect land prices in Japan. High levels of land prices may reflect the high economic value of
low-crime neighborhoods. However, the Ordinary Least Square (OLS) estimate may cause a bias because the crime rate is not 
necessarily an exogenous determinant of land price.  Therefore, in this study, we adopt the instrumental variable (IV) method, and 
use instrumental variables such as distance from police boxes and existence of voluntary anti-crime groups, and analyze the effects of 
property crime rates on residential land prices.  The results show that a 10% decrease in the rate of burglaries causes an average rise 
in residential land prices of 1%.
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㸯㸬Introduction
Japan is well known as a country with fewer crimes in urban areas compared to other 
developed countries.  However, during the 1990s and the 2000s the number of crimes has 
been increasing dramatically in major cities. The number of crimes in 2006 was about 1.5 
times of that 30 years before. On the other hand, the rate of crime detection is only 
31.2%, which is a decrease of half from 60% some 30 years ago.
1
Within cities, crime is spatially concentrated.  For example, in HikawadaiࠊNerima
ward, the northeast area of the Tokyo Metropolitan Area
According to the 
National Police Agency of Japan, the total number of recognized criminal-law criminals in 
2006 still exceeds 2,000,000, although it is not as high as the figure of about 2,850,000 
estimated in 2002.
2
                                                  
National Police Agency released the figures in the 2008 Police Whitepaper
, there were 1.552 burglaries per 
100 households in residential areas in the average of 2005-2007,which are 6 times more 
than the average number of all neighborhoods, 0.258. On the other hand, the figure in 
Minami-Shinozakicho 5 Chome, Edogawa ward (east area of Tokyo) was 0 from 2005 to 
2007. We can find the difference of the number of burglaries not only between wards but 
also within each ward.  For example, in Shibuya ward, the southeast area of the Tokyo 
Metropolitan Area, the number amounts to 0.360, which are about 1.5 times as many as the 
average number of every ward, 0.258.    On the other hands, the number in Hiroo 2 Chome 
amounts to 0.966, which are more than 9 times more than the number in Hatagaya 3 Chome, 
0.094. Therefore the difference of the number of crimes may be seen at the ward level,
but the agglomeration is not caused by each ward itself, but caused by the characteristics 
The area of the 23 wards of the Tokyo Metropolitan area is 621.97 km2.  There were 
4,242,089 households, with 8,318,848 persons in the area in 2007.  3 
of neighborhood or location as stated later.
The spatial concentration of crime is shown clearly by mapping the incidence of crime 
geographically. Figure 1 illustrates the geographical distribution of burglaries in the 23 
wards of Tokyo.  The map is constructed by counting crimes per 100 households in 
neighborhoods in 2005. The locations of police boxes are also plotted on the map.
High-crime areas exist along major roads and in the southwest area where old wooden 
buildings are concentrated.
The spatial concentration may be caused by the locations of police boxes or the 
number of voluntary group members. Police boxes (called “Koban” in Japan) form part 
of a widely prevalent police system along with police stations. Several policemen 
stationed in police boxes monitor the safety of a neighborhood, make crime reports, and 
arrest criminals. The number of crimes per 100 households (crime rate) in a 
neighborhood far from a police box may be high because the frequency of patrols and 
monitoring by policemen decreases as the distance from a police box increases. 
Voluntary crime-prevention groups are organized with the assistance and advice of 
the Police Agency in Japan.  They engage in crime-prevention activities such as 
providing regional safety information to their neighborhoods, patrolling, finding 
crimes, and reporting to the police.  They have neither firearms nor any equipment for 
their personal safety and cannot replace the activities of the police, but by patrolling 
neighborhoods they may contribute to their safety. 
The Metropolitan Police research voluntary group members and publish their 
numbers for the areas covered by police stations, which may comprise several  4 
neighborhoods, every year.  We can obtain the ratio of the number of voluntary group 
members to the population in each neighborhood. The crime rate in a neighborhood 
with a high ratio of voluntary group members may be low because of a voluntary
group’s activities.
Although most residents of high-crime areas may not suffer from property crime 
directly because they can increase their level of security by themselves, they may face 
economic losses from a devaluation of land prices because some residents of high-crime 
areas move to low-crime areas for fear of crime.  This movement would cause economic 
losses through an emigration of labor from the area and a decrease of residential land 
demand, which would accelerate the increase of crime and a spiraling decline of land 
prices.  On the other hand, demand in low-crime areas will increase. Therefore,  the 
low-crime residential land price will increase, which reflects the utility of residents of 
low-crime areas. By analyzing differences between land prices in low-crime areas and 
those in high-crime areas, we can determine how residents evaluate security.  The 
analysis would be useful for planning crime-prevention measures in the city in the future. 
Estimating the effects property crimes in a neighborhood have on land prices has not 
been attempted until recently in Japan, because the police authority did not publish data on 
crimes at a geographically localized level until 2001. The Metropolitan Police Bureau 
has published detailed data in Tokyo since 2002.
There are two fundamental problems with an empirical analysis of the impacts of 
property crimes on land prices.
First, the crime rate is an endogenous variable, and a negative correlation between  5 
land prices and crime rates does not necessarily mean that an increase in the crime rate 
decreases land prices, because changes in the value of land also changes the behavior of 
criminals, affecting the number of crimes in each neighborhood simultaneously when the 
number of property crimes affects land prices in that neighborhood.  For example, in a 
high land-price area, where high-income residents may live, we observe a higher number 
of burglaries because criminals target the properties of wealthy people.  At the same time, 
high-income households can afford to keep a good environment in their neighborhoods, 
which drives land prices higher.  In this case, the estimated coefficients of Ordinary Least 
Square (OLS) will be positively biased and we may find a positive relationship between 
crime and land price from OLS, even though the causal relationship between crime rate 
and land price is negative. On the other hand, low land prices may attract low-income 
residents who cannot afford to keep a good environment in their neighborhood, which 
drives land prices lower.  We also observe many property criminals in areas where the 
proportion of low-income residents is high, because low-income criminals are prone to 
commit crimes in their own neighborhoods because of transportation costs and low-income 
residents cannot afford to defend themselves against crime. (As a result, fewer criminals 
can be found in an area where the proportion of middle-class people is higher than in the 
other area.)  In this case, the regression estimation may be biased toward a negative 
relationship.  As a result, an OLS regression can lead us to a biased estimation because of 
the endogeneity of crime.
Second, there may be measurement errors in reported crime data in addition to the 
bias caused by endogeneity.  6 
Simultaneity and measurement errors can cause a bias in the estimated effects of 
crime on land prices obtained by the OLS regression.  To solve the problem, we adopt the 
Instrumental Variable estimation (IV) using panel data and Propensity Score Matching 
(PSM). 
In this study, we analyze the factors that affect the crime rate (the number of crimes 
per 100 households) and estimate land price in the 23 wards of Tokyo using explanatory 
factors including the crime rate.  The analysis covers burglaries and felonious or violent 
crimes and the effects in several levels of crime rates. The crime rate is estimated using 
certain factors as instrumental variables, for example, the distance from police boxes or
the ratio of the number of voluntary group members working to prevent crimes to the 
population in each neighborhood. In addition, we divide the land market into several 
submarkets by its characteristics and regions, and analyze the effect of crimes in the 
submarkets.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we introduce previous studies on the 
effects of crime rates on land prices. In Section 3, we introduce the data, model and 
method we use in this report. In Section 4, we present the results of the estimation, and 
then offer conclusions in Section 5.
2. Brief review of the literature
Several studies in the US and the UK estimate the influence of crime rates on property 
values based on the Hedonic approach. Although considerable research has been 
conducted to analyze the determinants of land prices in urban areas in Japan by OLS, few  7 
studies examine the effects of crime rates on land prices. 
In the US, Thaler (1978) analyzed the effects of property crime rates on land prices in 
Rochester, New York.  Thaler set up a model explaining house prices using property 
crimes per unit of population as well as land-use form, distance from public 
accommodation and rooms, and claims that property crimes have significant effects on 
house prices.  Hellman and Naroff (1979) estimated the determinants of housing prices in 
Boston using distance from the downtown area, household income level, and crimes per 
1000 persons based on the theoretical model of Muth (1969). They concluded that crimes 
have negative effects on housing prices, and that the elasticity is -0.63.  Lynch and 
Rasmussen (2001) attempted to use the Hedonic analysis to estimate the effects of violent 
and property crimes on house prices in Jacksonville, Florida through neighborhood 
variables such as percentage of Hispanics, percentage of owner-occupied housing, and 
median household income as independent variables.  Violent crimes per unit of 
population have negative effects on house prices, but property crimes per unit of 
population have positive effects. 
In these studies, the endogeneity of crime rates was not considered. As mentioned 
before, housing prices or land prices can affect crime rates simultaneously. The 
endogeneity of crime will cause a bias in the estimation. 
Bowes and Ihlanfeldt (2001) analyzed factors affecting crimes in Atlanta. They showed 
that crimes per acre have a significantly negative influence on house prices and that crime 
rates become high when the proportion of low-income people is high. However, they 
estimated the determinants of crime and house prices independently, and they did not  8 
conduct simultaneous estimations of crime rates and house prices. 
Gibbons (2004) investigated the determinants of property value in London using a 
measure of crime damage per 100 squares, space, floors, building years, distance to city 
center (Soho district), building density, households density, population density, distance to 
nearest subway station, and distance to the council office as explanatory variables.  He 
used the IV estimation and showed that crime damage affects housing land prices and that 
a 10% increase in crime leads to a fall of property values of 1.5%.
In addition, Linden and Rockoff (2006) clarified that house prices in the 
neighborhood of criminals fell because location information on criminals provided by the 
enforcement of Megan's Law was disclosed. In other words local property values fell 
because the residence of a criminal was regarded as a threat to security.
Few studies conducted empirical analyses on the relations between land prices and 
crimes in residential areas in Japan. Hiraoka (2005) empirically analyzed the relationship 
between crime rates and land prices in Osaka, but his results showed no significant 
relationship between crime rates and land prices. Kutsuzawa, Yamaga, Mizutani, and 
Ohtake (2007) analyzed the effects of crime rates on land prices by the instrumental
variable method using locations of police boxes, ratio of low-income people, and ratio of 
road area as instrumental variables for crime rates from cross-sectional data. The 
analysis showed that a 10% increase in crime causes a 1.7% decrease in land prices. The 
data include neither time-series crime data nor voluntary group members and the number 
of land price sample amounts to less than 1,000, therefore the analysis covers neither 
panel-data analysis nor Propensity Score Matching and it did not cover the analysis of  9 
voluntary group members’ activities.  Only burglary crimes were analyzed and felonious 
or violent crimes were not analyzed. The segregation of the market is attempted in only 
geographically divided areas.
Based on previous literature, we estimated the effects of various crime rates on land 
prices in the 23 wards of Tokyo using panel data from 2005 to 2007. Its samples amount 
to more than 18,000, and we analyzed the submarkets divided by several areas and 
characteristics.
Because crime rates are endogenous variables, we estimated the effects of crime rates 
on land prices using distance from police boxes and voluntary members rate as 
instrumental variables. In addition, we also use Propensity Score Matching to test the 
validity of the IV analysis.
㸱㸬Methodology 
We estimated the Hedonic land price model using crime rates, location 
characteristics, and neighborhood characteristics as explanatory variables. In the 
estimation, we treated crime rates as an endogenous variable because the number of 
property crimes can be affected by regional factors such as locations of police boxes or 
voluntary members ratio.
Table 1 shows definitions of dependent, explanatory, and instrumental variables, 
and Table 2 summarizes these variables.
(1) Data 10 
We used the land price data provided by the Tokyo Real Estate Foundation, which 
is a business organization of real estate enterprises in Tokyo. The Foundation 
conducts a survey of land prices on March 1st every year in the area of the 23 wards of 
Tokyo.  The Foundation ask its members (they are appraisers qualified by the 
Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism) to evaluate the land price.  
They evaluated the land price based on the Appraisal Standard which the Minister of 
Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism designated.
The data include land price data at around 6,000 points of residential areas, 
location characteristics data, and neighborhood characteristics data.
We also obtained data on the number of crimes including burglaries and felonious 
or violent crimes
3
                                                  
Felonious crimes include murder, robbery, arson and rape.  Violent crimes include assault, bodily 
injury, intimidation and extortion.
in more than 3,000 neighborhoods that are small block areas called 
“chome” or “machi.”  The data were recorded and supplied by the Metropolitan 
Police Agency. We calculated the sum of crimes per 100 households in the 
neighborhood as crime rate and analyzed the relationship between crime rate and land 
price.  The Metropolitan Police Authority has the data of crimes in each neighborhood 
area and discloses them at neighborhood level. It discloses neither meshed data nor data 
at street level or point level. The limited disclosure of locations of property crimes may 
bias the estimated coefficient. The addresses in the cities of Japan, however are neither
formulated in street level nor buffers level, but in neighborhood level. The data of land
price can be matched to the crime data by the address formulation based on neighborhood.   
We, therefore use the data of crimes on the level of neighborhoods. 11 
The average area of a neighborhood was 19.84 ha, and there were 1,355 
households and 2,657 residents in an area on average.  The number of burglaries 
from 2005 to 2007 was 0.258 cases per 100 households in each neighborhood on 
average.
The crime rates are different not only among wards but also neighborhoods, and 
the differences are caused not by each ward itself, but by the characteristics of 
location or neighborhood.  The data of crime data is researched only by the Tokyo 
Metropolitan Authority coincidently and no other observation is included.  Land 
price has nothing to do with the ward the point is belonging to, because the residents 
are not interested in the ward of their residence, but in the characteristics of their 
residence, and crime rates have nothing to do with the ward where crime rates show, 
because criminals also tend to commit the crimes not in the specific wards, but in the 
place which is favorable for them to do.   
Therefore, we assume the crime rates are not clustered at the ward level and we 
use the IV estimation just with robust standard error method and panel IV estimation
as shown in (2) and (3).
We also used location characteristics and neighborhood characteristics data as 
explanatory variables of land prices.
  Location characteristics variables include walking time from a sample point to 
the nearest station, travel time from the nearest station to Tokyo Station, city planning 
regulations on land use, building space per site and floor space per site, and dummy 
variables for railway or subway lines of the nearest stations. 12 
Neighborhood characteristics variables include percentage of owner-occupied 
households, “unburnable rate” (which means the proportion of non-wooden building 
floor space of total building floor space), the rate of households within annual 
household income groups (6 groups: below 3 million yen, from 3 million to 5 million 
yen, 5 million yen to 7 million yen, 7 million yen to 10 million yen, 10 million yen to 
15 million yen, and more than 15 million yen), and the proportion of land use in each 
neighborhood (We used the proportion of commercial use, industrial use, farm and 
agricultural use, roads, and parks).  We also used the average area of housing floor 
per person in the neighborhood as an alternative variable to household income to imply 
the affluence of households in the neighborhood.
We calculate the walking time from the nearest station and travel time from 
Tokyo Station using "Yahoo! Travel” “Yahoo! Map.” Data on land use, wooden 
building floor space, and percentage of owner-occupied households were obtained 
from the City Planning Bureau of the Tokyo Metropolitan Government. We obtained 
data on the number of households within annual household income groups from UDS 
Co. Ltd., which makes the model based on the data of the household number of each 
ward within several annual income levels in the Housing and Land Survey and their 
characteristics data in the National Census.
4
                                                  
 The Housing and Land Survey shows us the number of households within annual 
household income groups in each wards.    In the National Census we can see the data of the 
number of various kinds of residents such as high school graduates, college graduates, 
university graduates, 20-34 years persons, 40-59 years persons, professional workers, 
technical workers and administrative workers in 100 meter square meshes, which are 
assumed to be correlated to annual income.    UDS makes the model to explain the number of 
residents within annual household income groups in each mesh by using the above 
characteristics of the residents.   UDS calculates the number of residents in the meshes by 
using the model and they also count the number in each neighborhood based on the data by 
each mesh.
The UDS data is trustworthy and even in  13 
the research subsidized by the national government, the data is utilized.
In addition, we obtained data on the distance from property to police boxes 
(including police stations)
5 and number of voluntary group members involved in 
crime-prevention activities. We used these as instrumental variables to explain the 
crime rate.  There are about 6,000 police boxes in Japan (1,000 police boxes are in the 
23 wards of Tokyo), and according to the Police Whitepaper (2006) by the police 
agency, at least 2 policemen in each police box are on duty all the day and their
activities in police box are expected to prevent crimes in neighborhoods.   
Consequently, its scale and function is not different among police boxes
6
We measured the distance between property and police boxes using the GIS 
system of the Center for Spatial Information Science at University of Tokyo (CSIS). 
The distance was assumed to affect the capacity of the police to prevent crime, because 
the frequency of patrols and monitoring by policemen decreases as the distance from 
police boxes increases.
.
The Tokyo Metropolitan Authority can set new police box or change the location, 
and the distances from police boxes is changing as shown in Table 3, and we assume 
that the longer it becomes, the larger the number of crimes tends to be, because the
effect of policemen’s activities will be weaker in the farther place from police boxes.  
Police box is peculiar system in Japan , and there are few studies about the relationship 
between crimes and the distance from the police boxes except our analysis.  Ahmadi
                                                  
Several police officers stay at police station and they are involved in similar activities to 
the one in police boxes, but their works are mainly administrative work in several 
neighborhoods area. 
We do not have more detailed data about the scale and function about police box, we, 
therefore, do not use synthetic variables.     14 
(2003), however, point out that the number of crimes have a positive relationship 
with the distance of police stations, and the relationship between crimes and police 
station can be applied to the relationship between crimes and police boxes, because the 
function of police stations is similar to that of police boxes.    The police authority may 
increase police boxes in the neighborhoods where crimes are increasing, and the 
distance from police boxes may have negative relationship with crimes.  The police 
authority in Japan must cope with the demand of local residents equally and the budget 
of the Metropolitan Police Authority is limited.  As a result, police boxes tend to be 
set spatial equally and the number of police boxes in each ward is changed gradually as 
shown in Table 4. We show the validity of our assumption that the distance from 
police boxes have positive effect on the crime rates in neighborhoods in the IV analysis 
and panel IV analysis of Section4. 
The number of the members of voluntary groups involved in crime prevention 
has been increasing rapidly in Japan and numbered over 40,000 in 2008.  For example, 
one voluntary group, which is called “Meidaimae Peace Makers,” is involved in 
crime-deterring activities such as patrolling in Setagaya Ward, located in southwest 
Tokyo, and contributes significantly to reducing burglaries. As  Calquhoun  (2004) 
pointed out, the activities of the neighborhood watch provide the police with “good 
eyes and ears” in the United Kingdom neighborhood watch groups and voluntary 
crime–prevention groups contribute to preventing crimes in neighborhoods.
The police authorities in Japan regard these voluntary groups as important 
partners for deterring crimes.  The police authorities encourage many citizens and  15 
private companies to organize voluntary groups for crime prevention to secure 
community safety, and collect data on the number of groups and their members in the 
area around each police station. 
We obtained data from the Tokyo Metropolitan Police Authority on voluntary 
group members in the 23 wards of Tokyo that are assumed to affect crimes.
The number of voluntary group members from 2005 to 2007 is shown in Table 3.   
The rate of voluntary members group is increasing and the crime rates are decreasing 
from 2005 to 2007.
We assume that the larger the number of voluntary members is, the smaller the 
rate of crime is, because many voluntary members will be better guard against 
burglaries. In the place of the high crime rate, they may consider their participation 
in voluntary group to prevent the increase of crime rates and the loss of their own 
property, but they can move to the place of low crime rate to avoid the damage by the 
increase of crime rate or the burden of the activities in the voluntary groups.  We, 
therefore assume high crime rates in the neighborhoods do not cause the high rate of 
voluntary group members.    We show the validity of our assumption in IV analysis and 
panel IV analysis of Section4. We also testify the influence of crime rate on   
voluntary members rate by using the time lag variable.   
(2) OLS and IV estimation
For the paper, we estimated the function of housing land price by specifying the 
explanatory variables of crime rate and other factors, and we estimated the property crime  16 
rate from instrumental variables to respond to the endogeneity problem of the crime rate.
The estimated model for land prices is expressed by Equation (1), which is a standard 
Hedonic price model with information specific to a property (For example, walking time to 
the nearest station, travel time from the nearest station to Tokyo Station, regulation of city 
planning on land) and number of property crimes in the neighborhood.
    i i i i year CrimeRate x P          	 ln i                             ( 1 )
ln Pi is the log-price of property i; xi is a set of exogenous variables that indicate 
property characteristics and neighborhood characteristics; CrimeRatei is crime rate, that is 
burglaries per 100 households and felonious or violent crimes and per 100 households in 
the neighborhood where property i is located; yeari is a set of dummy variables for the year 
	
			 If the increase in the 
crime rate decreases land prices in the area including point i, parameter  should be 
negative.  The problem is that information on property i is not always completely 
observed, and that unobserved information is treated as an error, which can be related to 
the number of property crimes in each area.  In other words, we cannot distinguish 
whether the land price is high because the number of burglaries in the neighborhood is 
high or the number of crimes is high because the land price in the neighborhood is high. 
The instrumental variable method is an effective means to solve the problem.  The 
relationship between crime rate and instrumental variables can be expressed by Equation 
(2). 
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Zi in Equation (2) is a set of instrumental variables. We adopt the distance between 
(2)   17 
police boxes and property i (including police stations, distance from police boxes) and the 
ratio of the members of voluntary groups working to prevent crimes to the population in 
the neighborhood of property i (voluntary members ratio) as instrumental variables that 
could influence the property crime rate.
Because we assume that the activities of the police to prevent crimes in the 
neighborhood will become weaker as the distance from police boxes increases, distance is 
assumed to have a positive effect on the crime rate.
When the voluntary member ratio is high, the crime rate is expected to be low, 
because many members of voluntary groups watch over the safety of the neighborhood.
Therefore, the coefficient of the crime rate for the voluntary member rate is expected to 
be negative.
We try to estimate the effect of crime rates on land price by using distance from 
police boxes and voluntary members rates as instrumental variables.
(3) Panel IV estimation
In addition to the IV cross-sectional analysis, we conducted an IV estimation using 
panel data to examine the effects of crime rate on land price, because crime rate may be 
correlated with an unobservable fixed effect. The estimation model for land price using 
panel data is expressed by Equation (3), where  is error over panels, and  is idiosyncratic 
error. 
it t it it t it CrimeRate x P          	 ln (3)
In Equation (3), the land price of property i in year t is estimated from exogenous  18 
variable x and crime rate.  Crime rate for year t in the neighborhood where property i is 
located (CrimeRateit) is an endogenous variable.
The average of crime rate is 0.258 and the range of the figure is from 0 to 2.106, 
which shows that the crime rate distribution is skewed to the right, therefore land price 
changes when crime rate exceed the certain point.  We analyze how the dummy variable 
affects land price when crime rate exceed certain point, from 0.01 to 0.6.
We also analyze the effect of crime rates in several submarkets of Tokyo 
Metropolitan Area, because the area is so wide that it can be more efficient for us to 
analyze the effect of crime rate in several segmented areas.  There are several ways to 
divide the Tokyo Metropolitan area.    We adopt 4 ways, the division by geographical way 
(the northeast area, the northwest area and the southwest area), the division by the 
regulation of floor area ration (less than 100%, from 100% to 200%, from 200% to 300% 
and above 300%), the division by walking time to the nearest station (less than 7min., from 
7 min. to 12 min. above 12 min.) and try the panel IV analysis in each submarket.
        We use the following F test for the statistical significance of the market segregation.
 
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    In the formula, SSEw means squared residuals in case of not-segmented, n means the
total samples, p is the number of parameters in the not-segmented model.  SSEp is the 
squared residuals in the segmented model.  ni means the number of the samples in the 
submarket i , and vi is the number of parameters in the submarket i.
(4)   19 
(4) Propensity Score Matching Method
The Propensity Score Matching Method is useful for analyzing non-randomized 
observational data just as crimes rate and land price are with the IV method.  The 
propensity score is defined by Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) as the conditional probability 
of receiving treatment given pre-treatment characteristics as given by Equation (5).

     X | D E X | D Pr X p 	 	  1 .                                        ( 5 )
Where  D={0, 1} is the indicator of exposure to treatment and X is the 
multidimensional vector of pre-treatment characteristics. If exposure to treatment is 
random within cells defined by X, it is also random within cells defined by the values of 
the mono-dimensional variable p(X). Given a population of units denoted by i, if the 
propensity score p(Xi) is known, the Average effect of Treatment on the Treated(ATT) can 
be estimated by Equation (6).
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In this paper, treatment means that the property i is located in a neighborhood where 
the crime rate is higher than the median of all property crime rates, therefore, D=1 means 
the crime rate is more than 0.20 cases per 100 households (median of all property crime 
rate) and D=0 means the crime rate is less than 0.20 cases per 100 households.  We try the 
same analysis under several standards of D=1, that is we specify the sample as D=1 when 
the crime rates are more than the figure from 0.01 to 0.8. We try several estimations to 
analyze the effect of crime rate on land price when crime rates exceed the certain level as 
we analyzed the effect in the Panel IV analysis. p(X) is the probability of D=1 and the 
(6)  20 
probability is estimated by a probit analysis using the vector of location characteristics,
neighborhood characteristics, distance from police boxes and voluntary members ratio of 
property i., which are used to estimate crime rate in IV analysis. In Equation (6), Y1i and 
Y0i are the potential outcomes in the two counterfactual situations of respectively treatment 
and no treatment (control).  Y1i therefore means the average land price under D=1 and Y0i
means the average land price under D=0.
The following two hypotheses are needed to derive ATT given (6). 
i) Balancing of pre-treatment variables
If p(X) is the propensity score then,
D ԋ X | p(X)
where X is the vector of characteristics of property. We conducted a test for the 
Balancing Hypothesis in the ATT estimation.
ii) Unconfoundedness given the propensity score. 
Assignment to treatment is unconfounded given the propensity score.
Y1 and Y0 ԋ D | p(X)                                  ( 8 )
As Imbens (2004) stated, the assumption is based on the “conditional independence 
assumption” which means that the potential outcome of Y1 ,Y0 and D are independent on 
the pre-treatment data, X. The crime rate which is used in IV estimation is endogenous 
variable, but in the propensity score matching, the independence of D from  Y1 ,Y0 is 
conditional on X.    As Lechner (2007) stated, some control variables may be influenced by 
the treatment, it doesn’t matter propensity score matching if conditional independence 
assumption is satisfied.  The propensity score matching therefore does not contradict to 
(7)  21 
the motivation of IV estimation.  Some studies as shown in Hackl, Halla and Prunkner
(2007) try the propensity score matching along with IV estimation.
We therefore try the propensity score matching analysis along with the IV 
estimation to check the result of IV estimation, because the propensity score matching 
method is completely different from OLS or panel IV analysis. To estimate ATT using 
equation (8), we must match treatment unit and control unit because p(X) is a continuous 
variable and the probability of two units with exactly the same value of propensity score is 
in principle zero, as Becker and Ichino (2002) stated. We use the three most widely used 
methods, which are Nearest Neighbor Matching, Kernel Matching, and Stratification 
Matching.
7 We calculate ATT to test the influence of the property crime rate and the 
robustness of the IV analysis in Equation (1).
4. Results
(1) Analysis by OLS and IV
We attempted OLS and IV analyses of land prices in the 23 wards of Tokyo and the 
influence of crime rate on land price.  At first, we begin our analysis as regards with the 
effects of crime rate of burglaries, because the number of burglaries is far larger than the 
other crimes.    We step on to the analysis as to felonious or violent crimes after burglaries.
The estimation result of OLS is shown in Column (1) of Table 5. The result shows 
that the coefficient of the logarithm of land price on crime rate is 0.059.  The result shows 
that crime rate is positively associated with the area where the housing land price is high 
                                                  
Becker and Ichino (2002) presented the formula for Nearest Neighbor Matching, Kernel 
Matching, and Stratification Matching. 22 
and where high-income residents may live.  As shown in the IV estimation later, the 
coefficient of crime rate on the ratio of high-income households is positive, which means 
the crime rate is higher in a neighborhood with affluent people. We infer that the 
estimated positive coefficient of OLS is contaminated by an upward bias from the 
endogeneity of crime rate.
Let us begin with the IV estimation to solve the endogeneity problem. Columns (2) 
and (3) of Table 5 show the results of the cross-sectional IV estimation with year dummy 
variables. Columns (4) and (5) of Table 5 show the results of the IV estimation with 
panel data.㸦We use household income as a dependent variable in the analysis of Columns 
(2) and (4). The average area of housing floor per person is used as a dependent 
variable alternatively in the analysis of Columns (3) and (5).㸧
Contrary to the result of the OLS estimation, the coefficients of land price on crime 
rate in the cross-sectional IV estimation are -3.912 and -3.980, and the coefficients in the 
panel-data IV estimation are -0.215 and -0.245.
The Wu-Hausmann Test rejects the null hypothesis that crime rate is not endogenous.
The Cragg Donald Test rejects the null hypothesis that instrumental variables are weakly 
identified and that they are underidentified at the level of 1%.  The Sargan Test indicates 
that there are not more instrument variables than endogenous variables except in the case 
of IV analysis in Column (3) of Table 5.
8
In the estimation, we used distance from police boxes and voluntary member ratio as 
                                                  
We also estimate fixed effects of panel data to compare the coefficient of Panel IV 
estimation.  The coefficient is -0.0241, which implies crime rates have negative effects on 
land prices, but the Hausmann Test shows the difference in coefficients between fixed effect 
and random effect is not systematic. We adopt panel-data IV estimation to avoid the 
correlation of crime rates with fixed effect. 23 
excluded instrumental variables.  The estimation results show that the coefficient of 
crime rate on distance from police boxes is significantly positive and that the coefficient of 
crime rate on voluntary members ratio is significantly negative.  We also estimate the 
coefficient of crime rate on the voluntary members rate in previous year to evade the effect 
of crime rate on next year’s voluntary members rate to take the possibility that crime rate 
may have the positive effect on the voluntary members rate into the consideration. The 
result coincides with the presumption that the weaker the capacity of police boxes to 
prevent crimes is, the longer the distance from the property to police boxes is, and that a 
large number of voluntary members are effective to prevent crimes. The coefficient of 
crime rate on the voluntary members rate in the previous year is negative, which means 
that voluntary members rate has the negative effect on crime rate in the next year as shown 
in Table6.
The crime rate also has significant coefficient explanatory variables such as income 
group ratio, unburnable building ratio, or land use ratio.
High-income households may become targets for property criminals. As expected, 
the estimated coefficient of the crime rate on the ratio of high-income groups is positive. 
The coefficients of crime rate on the ratio of households with over 15 million yen in annual 
income is 1.398 (Z=13.70) in Column (2)’ of Table 6. Low-income criminals tend to 
commit crimes in their neighborhoods and low-income households are not well prepared 
for the danger of property crimes, because they have insufficient financial resources to 
spare on preventing crimes. The result of the analysis of Column (2)’ of Table 6 is that 
the coefficient of the ratio of low-income group amounts to 0.280 (Z=6.40), showing that a  24 
low-income ratio area raises the crime rate.
We also use size of house as an alternative variable.  The estimated coefficient of 
crime rate on the average of the housing floor area in neighborhood is significantly 
positive in Table 6 (Columns (3)’ and (5)’) because larger houses also can be targets of 
burglaries.
An area with a high ratio of burnable wooden rental apartments is not only dangerous 
in the event of an earthquake but also in terms of property crimes, because criminals can 
hide from police and residents in an area filled with burnable houses and narrow roads. 
The City Planning Bureau of Tokyo Metropolitan Government designates dangerous areas 
in the event of an earthquake, where many old wooden rental apartments stand along 
narrow roads. Koide (2005) warns that there are a lot of property crimes in the designated 
area, which is caused by the above prediction.  The result of an analysis of Table 6 also 
shows a positive coefficient of crime rate at below a 50% unburnable ratio and a negative 
coefficient of crime rate on owner-occupied rate at a significant level, which means a 
neighborhood with many rental apartments faces the threat of property crimes.
As regards land use, in the area with a higher ratio of roads, the crime rate tends to 
be higher because many criminals tend to travel along trunk road to find suitable places to 
burgle. Poyner (1983) warns that residing in an area along a trunk road is a crime risk. 
The result of the analysis of Table 6 also shows that the coefficient of crime rate on the 
ratio of road area is positive.
In a neighborhood with a lot of commercial or office buildings, the crime rate rises. 
According to Colquhoun (2004), in places near downtown areas, young criminals tend to  25 
gather and commit property crimes.  The coefficient of crime rate in the regression of the 
ratio of commercial or office use is positive in the analysis of Table 6.
We try to analyze the effect of felonious or violent crimes by IV panel analysis as 
shown.  The coefficient is -0.143, which implies that the crimes such as murder, arson, 
rape, assault or bodily injury also has the negative effect on land price as shown in Table 7.
The coefficient is smaller than that of burglaries and we could premise the residents in the 
Tokyo Metropolitan are not as keen to the danger of felonious or violent crimes as that of 
burglaries.
We use the dummy variable which equals 1 if crime rate is more than certain level 
(from 0.01 to 0.6) to examine the effect of the crime rate when it exceeds certain point.  
The results are shown in Table 8.  The coefficient of the dummy variable that is 1 when 
crime rate exceeds 0.01 is larger than when crime rate is 0.2 or 0.3 which is around the 
average of crime rate.  It means that crime rate has negative effects on land price, when 
crime rate does not exceed far lower level than the average, such as 0.01.
We also analyze the effect of crime rates in several submarkets of Tokyo 
Metropolitan Area by using 4 ways. 
We analyze not only the coefficients of crime rate in the segmented areas, but also 
the efficiency of analysis by using F test as regards with the residuals of IV-panel analysis, 
and the results are shown in table 9.
The results show that the coefficient of crime rate is negative in each submarket.  
The F-test shows us that the division by geographical way and the division by the 
regulation of floor area ratio are not efficient.    26 
Tanaka and Asami (2005) point out that the Japanese residents do not prefer specific 
area and that geographical submarket can’t be formed.    On the other hand, they state that 
the ‘characteristic space’ divided by location characteristics such as time to nearest station 
can form the submarket.    The result of the analysis can prove the statement.
The result also implies that in the residential areas where the travelling time is from 
30-40 minutes from the Tokyo station, or walking time is 7-12 minutes from the nearest 
station, the effect of crime rate on land price is larger than the other areas and which means 
that residents get stronger damage on their preference to their location when they 
encounter the burglars in such better place to live.
(2) Estimation Results of Propensity Score Matching Method
We use instrumental variables such as distance from police box and voluntary 
members rate to estimate the effect of crime rate in IV analysis or panel IV analysis, but 
there is some problem if we select appropriate instrument variables. We also conduct a 
Propensity Score Matching analysis, because we try to testify the validity of the 
hypothesis high crime rate have negative effect on land price.    The method is completely 
different from the hedonic approach, and it is the way of the estimation of treatment 
effect by comparing treated and control samples which are similar in their factors except 
crime rates.
As mentioned in 3. (2), we define treated as more than 0.20 crimes per 100 
households in the neighborhood (0.20 is a medium of total samples), and we estimate the 
Propensity Score by probit analysis using location characteristics, neighborhood  27 
characteristics, distance from police boxes and voluntary members ratio.    We use rich and 
informative dataset to explain the Propensity Score to support the conditional 
independence assumption.  The result of probit analysis is shown in Table 10 and a 
description of the Propensity Score is given in Table 11. We tested to confirm that the 
average propensity score of treated and control units and the means of each characteristic 
do not differ between treated and control units.  In the analysis, the Balancing Hypothesis 
is satisfied. We also estimate the propensity score under the standard that D=1 means the 
crime rates are more than the figure 0.01 to 0.8.
The estimation result obtained by the Propensity Score Matching Method is shown in 
Table 12. The standard error is estimated through a bootstrap estimation.  ATT shows 
generally significant negative coefficients, which means that property crimes have a 
negative impact on land prices, and agrees with the result of the IV estimation.  Table 13
shows that the ATT figures are different among several analysis under different standards 
of D=1, and that the ATT shows negative effects of crime rate.    The result shows that the 
negative effects of crime rates are apparent regardless of the level of crime rates. 
5. Conclusion 
Estimating OLS and IV clarified that property crimes rate play a role in decreasing 
land prices regardless of local inhabitants and land-use situation. According to the 
estimated results, land price will fall around 1% in the event of a 10% rise in property test 
scores.
9
                                                  
9 In the case of panel IV analysis, it is exp(-0.245*0.403*0.10)㸫1䍦㻙0.00995. 0.403 means crimes per 
100 households in 2005.
The inhabitants who do not suffer from break-in burglaries directly can suffer  28 
from the land price fall effect, which is a disadvantage in terms of loss of safety from 
crimes.  It is thought that the loss of land price reflects the intention of a resident to pay 
for safety. The estimation is useful to encourage measures to prevent property crime and 
ensure the effectiveness of measures. For example, a detached house owner in the Tokyo 
Metropolitan Area whose house site amounts to 112 square meter (It is the average of 
housing site in the City of Tokyo, Kanagawa, Chiba and Saitama Prefecture) has about 55 
million yen of the housing land, because the average land price per square meter 537,111 
yen. That means the average house owner suffers the loss of 550thousand yen when 
crime rate is rising.  In other words, it is economically rational that the house owner 
should pay about 550 thousand yen to guard against crimes if he hopes to evade crime rate 
rising by 10%.  The Tokyo Metropolitan Government tries to improve the safety from 
crimes and has spent a lot of money on the policy of keeping the peace in the residential 
area.    The estimation can be applied when the policy makers estimate the cost and benefit 
of police authority or safety keeping activity.   
The estimation shows that police boxes and number of voluntary group members 
inhibit property crimes.  The analysis also shows that a residential area with many 
low-income households, and with a lot of burnable buildings, faces the threat of property 
crimes.
The results also imply that policy measures to increase police boxes or voluntary 
group members are effective for decreasing crimes.  Policy measures that pay attention to 
low-income households or redeveloping urban areas will also be effective for creating 
safer cities.  29 
As mentioned before, the Tokyo Metropolitan Government try to improve the safety 
and the government put an emphasis on rearing voluntary group activities.  The 
Metropolitan Police Authority also assists the formation of the groups and retired 
policemen help such activities.    The estimation also shows such activities are effective in 
decreasing crimes, therefore it shows the policy of the government is effective.
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Figure 1 Geographical distribution of burglaries and locations of police boxes in the 23 
wards of Tokyo (2005) 33 
Table 1 Explanation of Data
Variables Description Source
Dependent Variables




Walking time (Min) Walking time to the nearest station Yahoo! Map
Travel time (Min) Travel time from nearest station to Tokyo Station Yahoo! Travel
Regulation on building
area ratio







The regulation on ratio of building area to total
area
Regulation on land use
ratio
The ratios of the following zoning areas
㺃Exclusively Residential Zone for Low-rise
Buildings㻌 (Class1, 2)





The ratios of areas of following forms of land use











Home ownership rate The rate of owner occupied households National Census
Unburnable ratio







The ratios of households within the following
annual household income groups
㺃- 3 million yen
㺃 3 million - 5 million yen
㺃 5 million - 7 million yen
㺃 7 million - 10 million yen




area in neighborhood (m
2)
The average of housing floor area per 










The distance from the nearest police box 




The ratio of the number of voluntary group 
members to the population in neighborhood
Metropolitan Police
Authority 34 
Table 2 Summary Statistics
Variables Sample Average Std. Dev. Min. Max.
Land price (yen/䟝) 18,283 537,111.3 349,087.9 81,818.1 8,666,667
Walking time (min) 18,283 10.807 5.865 1 41
Traveling time (min) 18,283 35.340 8.571 12 54
Regulation on building area ratio (%) 18,283 56.776 5.748 30 80
Regulation on floor area ratio (%) 18,283 192.124 83.068 60 500
Regulation on land use ratio (%) 18,283
Exclusively Residential Zone for 
Low-rise Buildings (Class1)
18,283 36.099 48.030 0 100
Exclusively Residential Zone for 
Low-rise Buildings (Class2)
18,283 1.969 13.894 0 100
Exclusively Residential Zone for
Medium-
18,283 27.599 44.703 0 100
Exclusively Residential Zone for 
Medium, High-rise Buildings (Class2)
18,283 2.576 15.842 0 100
Residential Zone (Class1) 18,283 26.391 44.076 0 100
Residential Zone (Class2) 18,283 3.468 18.297 0 100
Semi-Residential Zone 18,283 1.898 13.646 0 100
Land use ratio (%)
㻌㻌Residential use 18,283 46.257 13.390 0.915 79.247
Commercial use 18,283 8.434 6.452 0 88.529
Industrial use 18,283 3.613 5.471 0 65.923
Farm or agricultural use 18,283 2.349 4.405 0 32.567
Public building  18,283 8.243 8.410 0 90.506
Road 18,283 19.576 5.119 0.095 48.434
Park 18,262 4.103 6.566 0 75.092
Unused 18,283 2.198 2.453 0 54.132
Home ownership rate (%) 18,283 48.512 12.549 1.373 86.667
Unburnable ratio (%)  18,283 59.983 18.081 12.970 99.980
Household income distribution ratio(%)
-3 million yen 18,283 28.097 8.260 0 65.371
3-5 million yen 18,283 23.499 6.863 0 50.658
5-7 million yen 18,283 14.336 5.623 0 38.473
7-10 million yen 18,283 14.245 4.744 0 39.581
10-15 million yen 18,283 9.354 3.377 0 28.886
15- million yen 18,283 5.600 3.575 0 24.886
Housing floor area in neighborhood (m
2) 18,283 31.134 4.738 0 61.800
Crime rate 18,283 0.258 0.221 0 2.106
Distance from police (m) 18,283 399.314 192.247 0 1364.29
Voluntary members ratio (%) 18,283 0.926 0.754 0.079 10.464 35 
Table 3 Change of crimes, distance from police box and voluntary members ratio
  Year  Mean  Std.  Dev  Min  Max 
Felonious or violent crimes  2005  0.158  0.396  0  8.602 
(Crimes per 100 households)  2006  0.167  0.458  0  14.894 
2007 0.155  0.477  0  18.261 
Ave 0.160  0.444  0  18.261 
Burglaries 2005  0.320  0.248  0  2.106 
2006 0.259  0.216  0  1.624 
2007 0.190  0.170  0  1.695 
Ave. 0.258  0.221  0  2.106 
Distance from Police Box  2005  401.954  193.435  0  1364.290 
2006 397.515  199.177  0  1364.290 
2007 398.346  192.069  0  1364.290 
Ave. 399.314  192.347  0  1364.290 
Voluntary Members Ratio  2005  0.802  0.732  0.079  10.464 
2006 0.934  0.660  0.079  10.328 
2007 1.047  0.838  0.108  10.015 
  Ave.  0.926  0.754  0.078  10.464 
Table 4 The number of police boxes in each ward
㻌  1999  2004  2005  2006  2007 
Chiyoda 21  21  21  22  19 
Chuou 27  26  26  26  22 
Minato 40  41  41  41  34 
Shinjuku 40  39  39  39  34 
Bunkyo 22  22  22  21  20 
Taito 30  30  30  30  27 
Sumida 29  28  28  28  23 
Koto 28  28  28  28  24 
Shinagawa 31  29  29  29  25 
Meguro 22  21  21  21  16 
Ohta 47  48  48  48  39 
Setagaya 45  44  44  45  39 
Shibuya 27  27  26  26  24 
Nakano 23  22  22  22  19 
Suginami 38  39  39  39  34 
Toshima 29  28  28  28  24 
Kita 29  27  27  26  24 
Arakawa 22  22  22  22  17 
Itabashi 36  35  35  35  32 
Nerima 33  33  33  33  30 
Adachi 43  43  43  42  39 
Katsushika 34  34  34  34  32 
Edogawa 37  37  37  37  35  
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